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Since the creation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987,
[hereinafter, "the Guidelines"], they have been a subject rife with
controversy, much of which has centered on the idea of "relevant
conduct," their supposed "cornerstone."' Relevant conduct, simply
put, is a universally applicable provision in the Guidelines that allows
a judge to take into account the peculiarities of the particular offense
committed when sentencing a criminal defendant, as opposed to
merely giving every criminal defendant the same sentence for the
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2000; B.A., Williams
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1. See generally, e.g., Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 2; Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1342 (1997); Daniel J.
Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681 (1992); Donald P. Lay, Rethinking the
Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE L.J. 1755 (1992); Elizabeth T. Lear, Is
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same statutory offense. The controversy surrounding the inclusion of
relevant conduct in the Guidelines has focused on its apparent
contrariness to the intent of Congress when it created the
Commission.
When Congress embarked on its sentencing revolution in 1984,
the hobgoblin which largely drove these legislative reforms was
judicial discretion at sentencing. Conservatives and liberals alike
found the unfettered role of the federal judge at sentencing to be
disturbing, expressing "fundamental and widespread dissatisfaction
with the uncertainties and disparities" of the indeterminate
sentencing structure previously in place.2
After considering and rejecting several other sentencing options,
Congress settled on a semi-mandatory guideline system as the ideal
method to control the judicial role at sentencing 3 To promulgate the
Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission was established as "an
independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States."'4
In 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), Congress outlined the purpose and
authority of the Sentencing Commission, as establishing
sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice
system that provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes
of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to
permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors taken into account in the establishment of
general sentencing practices. 5
In light of this congressional mandate, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines were born, created by the Sentencing Commission. The
Guidelines were structured so that two central factors-the offense of
conviction and criminal history-would be determinative in the
sentence given to a defendant.6 However, despite the formulaic
nature of the Guidelines, one little provision contained within the
Guidelines seemed to open the door for judicial discretion to sneak
back in: Section 1B1.3, Relevant Conduct.7 This provision allows a
2. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,366 (1989).
3. See William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 501 (1990). According to
Wilkins and Steer, the House version of sentencing reform legislation provided for an
offense of conviction sentencing system, whereas the Senate version "seemed to lean
toward a real offense system." Id.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1987).
5. Id. § 991(b)(1)(B).
6. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A Sentencing
Table (1998).
7. See id. § 1B1.3. It can be argued, particularly after Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
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judge to increase a defendant's sentence, which is otherwise derived
from the enumerated factors contained within the guideline for that
offense, for any further criminal conduct related to the crime. Much
has been written concerning the inclusion of relevant conduct in the
Guidelines and the wisdom behind that decision. 8
However, this Note does not focus on the creation of the
Guidelines or the choice to include relevant conduct per se. Instead,
it focuses on the aftermath of the creation of the Guidelines and the
inclusion of relevant conduct. It argues that peculiar, unintended
consequences have largely been the result of this attempted reform.
The inclusion of relevant conduct, despite its debatable connection to
congressional intent, combined with a statute left over from pre-
Guideline sentencing that mandates rampant judicial discretion at
sentencing, has allowed the disparity-producing sentencing of old to
creep back into the post-Guideline world. This time, however, the
wide-ranging discretion to consider virtually any conduct at
sentencing is comfortably hidden behind the curtain of agency
discretion, making appellate review deferential at best and
nonexistent at worst.
81 (1996), that the ability of a sentencing judge to depart from the prescribed sentence for
a crime is also indicative of post-Guideline judicial discretion. In Koon, the Court held
that "[t]he [Sentencing Reform] Act did not eliminate all of the district court's discretion."
Id. at 92. However, I would argue that the discretion given to a judge to depart from the
Guidelines is simply not comparable to the discretion hidden within the relevant conduct
provision of the Guidelines for the reasons that follow. First, departures are structurally
supplementary to the Guidelines themselves; as the Commission explained, "when a court
finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where
conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is
warranted." Id. at 93. When a departure is applied, it is recognized that the court is taking
into account unusual circumstances that take it outside of the Guideline's "heartland."
See id. Unlike a departure, however, the inquiry a sentencing judge undertakes regarding
relevant conduct is considered part and parcel of the application of the Guideline itself.
Therefore, the discretion given to sentencing judges is very different in nature: in one
instance (that of the departure authority), it acts as a permissible check or counterbalance
to the Commission's generalized guidelines; whereas in the other instance (relevant
conduct), it seems to undercut the very nature of the guidelines themselves by allowing in
back-door discretion. Because of these reasons, the departure discretion does not have
the same ramifications for the structural integrity of the current sentencing system.
8. See generally, e.g., Lauren Greenwald, Relevant Conduct and the Impact of the
Preponderance Standard of Proof Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Denial of
Due Process, 18 VT. L. REv. 529 (1992); William J. Kirchner, Punishment Despite
Acquittal- An Unconstitutional Aspect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?, 34 ARIz. L.
REV. 799 (1992); Christine A. Neuharth, Sentencing Enhancement Through Relevant
Conduct: United States v. Galloway and the Implications for Due Process, 27 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 809 (1993-94); Michael Schecter, Sentencing Enhancements Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Punishment Without Proof, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
653 (1992-93).
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To better illustrate the current state of sentencing affairs, insight
can be gained by focusing on a specific provision in the Guidelines,
section 2G2.2(b)(4). Although this provision is a sentencing
enhancement and therefore separate from the relevant conduct
inquiry undertaken in section 1B1.3, it is a clear indication of how far
beyond relevant conduct courts can now go and a warning about the
possible future of federal criminal sentencing. Under section
2G2.2(b)(4), a five-level sentencing enhancement is added to a
criminal defendant's conviction for possession of child pornography
when a defendant has engaged in "a pattern of activity involving the
sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor."9 This enhancement requires
a sentencing judge, when deciding whether or not this particular
enhancement applies to a criminal defendant, to look far beyond the
confines of relevant conduct, which had previously been construed as
limited to conduct factually and temporally related to the criminal
conduct in question. Instead, the Commission expressly authorized
sentencing judges to look at any instance of sexual abuse or
exploitation of a minor that the defendant may have committed,
regardless of whether or not this prior instance was connected with
the criminal activity in question either factually or temporally. For
the first time since the Guidelines were enacted, under section
2G2.2(b)(4), a judge again had the freedom to engage in the type of
unfettered sentencing inquiry that existed in pre-Guideline
sentencing, which ironically was the type of inquiry that Congress
sought to control through the creation of the Guidelines.
This Note argues that the Commission has strayed far from its
original mission of reducing disparities and creating certainty and
fairness in federal criminal sentencing. The combination of
substantive discretion at the sentencing level and procedural
deference at the appellate level has created an environment that
allows increasing indiscretion by the Sentencing Commission.
Contrary to the desired goal of reducing sentencing disparities, the
Commission now has the authority to mandate broad inquiries by a
sentencing judge into any information about a defendant's past, which
produces the effect of vastly different sentences for similar crimes.
This sentencing enhancement is a glimpse of what could be the future
of the Guidelines-the Sentencing Commission has become the
equivalent of the pre-Guideline sentencing judge, giving out wildly
disparate sentences on the basis of conduct completely unrelated to
the offense of conviction.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the sentencing
discretion hidden within the post-Guideline world, through the
9. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(4) (1998).
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simultaneous existence of the relevant conduct provision in the
Guidelines and the continuing presence of a pre-Guideline statute, 18
U.S.C. § 3661, which endorses broad judicial discretion at sentencing.
In Part I, the far-reaching growth of this discretion at sentencing will
be illustrated through the example of section 2G2.2(b)(4). Part II will
explore the lack of procedural checks on the Sentencing Commission,
due to the increasingly deferential stance of the appellate courts
towards the Guidelines. Once again, this will be illustrated through
the example of section 2G2.2(b)(4). In Part III, I will argue that this
is precisely the wrong direction for the Commission to be headed.
Finally, Part IV will also present a few proposals for reigning in the
Sentencing Commission so as to fulfill the purpose for which it was
created.
H. A Brave New World? The Birth of Relevant Conduct and
the Rebirth of Judicial Discretion
A. Relevant Conduct: Judicial Discretion Dressed in the Commission's
Clothing
When Congress enacted the statutory framework for sentencing
reform, the Commission was authorized to enact guidelines that
determined "the appropriate length of a term... of imprisonment."' 0
These guidelines were to take into account "the circumstances under
which the offense was committed which mitigate or aggravate the
seriousness of the offense."" Confusingly, Congress also left intact
previous sentencing statutes, in which judges were given wide latitude
in their sentencing inquiry.12 Within this statutory framework, the
Commission was required to create the Guidelines, and it had no
discretion to ignore these statutory directives.' 3 However, during
implementation of these directives, the Commission wrestled with
what the statutes actually required of them.
As then-Judge Stephen Breyer, a former Sentencing
Commissioner at the time the Guidelines were created, explained, the
debate concerning the structure of the Guidelines boiled down to a
10. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)(B) (1987).
11. Id. § 994(c)(2).
12. See id. § 3661 ("No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of
the United States may receive and consider for the purposes of imposing an appropriate
sentence.").
13. See S. REP. No. 225, at 163 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3346
("The sentencing guidelines ... must be consistent with all pertinent provisions of titles 18
and 28.").
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choice between two competing ideas: a "real offense" system, in
which the circumstances of an offense were taken into account at
sentencing, or a "charge offense" system, in which the sentence
reflected only the crime charged.14 The rationale behind a "charge
offense" system was the elimination of arbitrary and capricious
disparities in sentencing, by tying punishments directly to the offense
for which the defendant was convicted. 5  "The basic premise
underlying a 'charge offense' system is that the guideline punishment
is presumed to reflect the severity of the corresponding statutory
crime.' 6 Despite the fact that a charge offense system seemed to
embody most closely the congressional vision of uniform sentences
for similar crimes and similar defendants, this system was criticized as
overly simplistic and incapable of recognizing the myriad of
differences in how crimes are committed, "which in the past have
made, and still should make, an important difference in terms of the
punishment imposed.'
7
On the other hand, a "real offense" system would require
punishment to be based on the actual conduct that occurred during
the commission of a crime.' 8 The criticism of this system involved the
fact it would require a post-trial fact-finding procedure to determine
the circumstances of the crime. This procedure could either involve
trial-type procedures, in which case it would be entirely
unmanageable, or it could be done informally, in which case it would
run the risk of appearing unfair.'9 More importantly, the larger risk
inherent in a real-offense system was that it would result in a return
to the "unfair, hidden nature of prior sentencing practices that the
Guidelines set about to change.
'20
As Judge Breyer summarized, "The upshot [was] a need for
compromise... The Commission's system [made] such a
compromise." 21  The result of this compromise was a sentencing
system falling somewhere in between a "real offense" system and a
14. See The Honorable Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1988).





20. Id. at 11.
21. Id. This statement has been criticized as inaccurately representing the proposals of
the House and Senate. See United States v. Davern, 970 F.2d 1490, 1501 (6th Cir. 1992)
(Merritt, C.J., dissenting) ("Although the Sentencing Commission and its chairman
consistently refer to these 'relevant conduct' provisions as the 'cornerstone of the federal
sentencing guidelines,' the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Act which authorized the
Guidelines does not expressly mention or authorize any such provisions.").
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"charge offense" system, in which the offense charged secures the
"base offense level" and then "real" aggravating or mitigating factors
and "real" characteristics of the offender are taken into account.22
Therefore, despite the need for reduced sentencing disparities, the
compromise enacted by the Sentencing Commission allowed for
deviations based on the conduct surrounding the offense.
Crucial to this system was section 1B1.3, entitled "Relevant
Conduct." 23 Defined as "the cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines" by the Chairman and General Counsel of the Sentencing
Commission, the idea of "relevant conduct" embodied what the
Commission saw as the fundamental policy decision underlying the
Guidelines.24 A sentencing court, while adjusting the base offense
level through specific offense characteristics, would look beyond the
conviction offense to actual criminal conduct, which was termed
"relevant conduct."5 "The parameters of this expanded view, which
the sentencing guidelines call 'Relevant Conduct,' are potentially
much broader than the minimum necessary to satisfy the elements of
the convicted offense."26  The language of section 1B1.3(a)(1)
provides a glimpse of how broad this provision is. It includes:
all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the
defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise
accountable, that occurred during the commission of the offense of
conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense, or
that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense.27
Despite the claim by the Sentencing Commissioners involved at the
time that a relevant conduct provision was the "cornerstone" of the
compromise system they created, vigorous debate occurred both in
the courts and the academic community regarding whether the
Commission had ignored the congressional directive given to it and
exceeded its statutory authority by enacting the relevant conduct
provision.28 Although section 1B1.3 survived the numerous legal
challenges relating to its statutory authority, the decisions have all
22. This sentencing system was described by the Sentencing Commission chairman
and general counsel as "blend[ing] the constraints of the offense of conviction with the
reality of the defendant's actual offense conduct in order to gauge the seriousness of that
conduct for sentencing purposes." Wilkins & Steer, supra note 3, at 497.
23. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (1998).
24. Wilkins & Steer, supra note 3, at 497.
25. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2).
26. Wilkins & Steer, supra note 3, at 502.
27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (emphasis added).
28. See, e.g., Lay, supra note 1, at 1764 ("If relevant conduct is indeed the
'cornerstone' of the federal guidelines, as Chairman Wilkins has claimed, it is a weak and
crumbling foundation indeed."); Lear, supra note 1, at 1179; Yellen, supra note 1, at 403.
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evidenced a profound confusion as to the necessity of "relevant
conduct" in fulfilling congressional purpose.29
Most courts relied on congressional intent as evidenced in 28
U.S.C. § 994 to give the Commission broad authority to promulgate
guidelines.30 For example, in United States v. Galloway, the Eighth
Circuit upheld the relevant conduct provision as within the authority
granted to the Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2), which allows
the Commission to promulgate guidelines that take into account "the
circumstances under which the offense was committed which mitigate
or aggravate the seriousness of the offense."131 The court relied upon
the reference by Congress to "circumstances... which... aggravate
the seriousness of the offense" as demonstrating clear congressional
intent to allow the Commission to look beyond the charged conduct
and therefore to enact section 1B1.3.32 However, the court
equivocated somewhat, stating that "even if it is not so clear," a
combination of other factors compelled this conclusion.33 These
factors included the open-ended language contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(c), which orders the Sentencing Commission to "consider
whether [certain factors later enumerated within the statute], among
others, have any relevance" in establishing guidelines.34 The phrase
"'among others' invites the Commission to consider sentencing
factors that Congress failed to specifically list. '35
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit opinion in United States v. Wong
characterized the relevant conduct provision as "an effort to
implement [the] objective" of 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2).36 However, the
court hesitated in stating how necessary this provision was, quoting
language from Galloway: "We are satisfied that within this broad
grant of authority to the Commission, this specific statutory language
of section 994(c)(2) gives the Commission full authority to adopt a
29. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Wong, 2 F.3d 927, 929-30 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414,
419-22 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Davern, 970 F.2d 1490, 1492-95 (6th Cir.
1992) (en banc).
30. See Galloway, 976 F.2d at 419-21; Wong, 2 F.3d at 929-30; Davern, 970 F.2d at 1495
n.6 ("Section 994(c)(2) authorizes the Sentencing Commission to consider 'the
circumstances under which the offense was committed which mitigate or aggravate the
seriousness of the offense."'); Thomas, 932 F.2d at 1089 ("We do not find the differences
between [28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2) and the language of section 1B1.3] to be any more than
superficial.").
31. Galloway, 976 F.2d at 421 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(2)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)).
35. Id. at 420.
36. 2 F.3d 927, 929 (9th Cir. 1993).
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relevant conduct guideline, although it certainly cannot be said that the
Commission was required to do so."'37 These opinions both ended
with a justification for the conclusion they had reached, in that under
the Chevron standard of review, the only "question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. '
38
Both decisions provoked impassioned dissenting opinions, which
claimed that the Sentencing Commission had far exceeded its
statutory authority by enacting relevant conduct provisions. 39 Judge
Beam, in his Galloway dissent, first attacked the reasoning behind the
oft-quoted depiction of relevant conduct as "the cornerstone of the
federal sentencing guideline system."40 According to Judge Beam,
the authority for that proposition was questionable, because it was
not clear that the Senate version of sentencing reform legislation
"adopted a 'real offense' system to the extent the authors assert."4'
Also, the statute which the majority relied on directed the
Commission, when it promulgated guidelines, to pay "particular
attention to the requirements of [28 U.S.C.] section 991(b)(1)(B) for
providing certainty and fairness in sentencing and reducing
unwarranted sentencing disparities." 42 This latter subsection required
the Commission to establish policies and practices that avoid
"unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct. '43
To do this, Congress established two factors as "the principle
determinants" of whether two cases were so similar that a difference
between their sentences should be considered a disparity: 1) the
prior records of the offenders, and 2) the criminal conduct for which
37. Id. at 930 (quoting Galloway, 976 F.2d at 420) (emphasis added).
38. Id. (quoting Galloway, 976 F.2d at 420).
39. See id. at 930 (Norris, J., dissenting); Galloway, 976 F.2d at 438 (Beam, J.,
dissenting); id. at 436 (Bright, J., dissenting). Judge Norris, in his dissenting opinion in
Wong, commented on the great amount of disagreement over "the controversial relevant
conduct provision." 2 F.3d at 930 n.1. He noted that, "[t]wo en banc decisions upholding
the guideline last year produced between them five impassioned dissents." Id For
support, he cited the dissent in Galloway. See id. at 930. He also cited the three dissenting
opinions in United States v. Davern, 970 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1992) (en bane). See id. (citing
Davern, 970 F.2d at 1501 (Merritt, CJ., dissenting) (§ 1B1.3 exceeds statutory authority
and is unconstitutional), 1513 (Martin, J., dissenting) (§ 1B1.3 exceeds statutory authority
and is unfair, especially with regard to controlled substance offenses) and 1514 (Jones, J.,
dissenting)).
40. Galloway, 976 F.2d at 429 (Beam, J., dissenting) (quoting from Wilkins & Steer,
supra note 3, at 496).
41. Id. (citing Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. V. 1987)).
42. Id. at 432.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
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they are being sentenced.44 Judge Beam asserted that "the relevant
conduct guideline promulgated by the Commission strays far from
this goal .... Indeed, since its promulgation, courts have repeatedly
struggled with the tendency of the relevant conduct provisions to
dwarf the actual count of conviction. '45 Therefore, these provisions
violate the Commission's primary task, which was to equalize
sentences between similar defendants found guilty of similar crimes.46
Judge Norris, in his dissenting opinion in Wong, also argued that
the Commission had erred in making relevant conduct the
cornerstone of the Guidelines.47 In his view, Congress had delineated
"with great care and specificity" how the Commission should
structure sentencing reform.48 The Commission ignored the factors
delineated by Congress in creating a guideline that punishes
unconvicted conduct.49 "Congress, not the Commission, has the
authority to lay cornerstones, and Congress has chosen convicted, not
unconvicted, conduct, as the cornerstone and building blocks of a
guidelines sentence. '50
Because the Supreme Court has never spoken directly to the
issue of the statutory authority for relevant conduct,51 the enactment
of a relevant conduct provision, although legally permissible, is not
perfectly or inarguably grounded. From its inception, it has been
deemed the "cornerstone" of the Guidelines, yet is also
acknowledged to be simply a compromise between two "pure"
models of sentencing. Furthermore, courts that have grappled with
the statutory authority for relevant conduct have skirted the
fundamental issue of whether this provision was necessary to achieve
44. Id.
45. Galloway, 976 F.2d at 432 (Beam, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 433. Interestingly, the majority opinion in Wong, the Ninth Circuit
decision upholding the relevant conduct provision, distinguished the facts in that case from
those in Galloway and asserted that its holding would not offend the dissenters in
Galloway. See United States v. Wong, 2 F.3d 927,930 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The holding which
the dissenting judges in Galloway would like to reach is actually a very narrow one. It is
stated by Judge Beam: 'I would hold the provision unenforceable insofar as it permits
offenders to be systematically penalized for factually and temporally distinct property
crimes that have neither been charged by indictment nor proven at trial.' In our case,
Wong's crimes were charged by the indictment, so even under the dissenters' view
articulated in Galloway, Wong's entire fraud scheme would be considered at
sentencing.").
47. See Wong, 2 F.3d at 931 (Norris, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 930.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 931.
51. In fact, a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied in United States v.
Thomas. See 932 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Pullock v. United States,
502 U.S. 895 (1991).
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the congressional goals for the Guidelines or whether it was simply
permissible for the Commission to have enacted it. In Galloway and
Wong, the courts both stated that the specific statutory authority of
§ 994(c)(2) gives the Commission full authority to enact relevant
conduct, yet both held only that the Commission's reading of that
statute was a permissible construction. Although seemingly here to
stay, relevant conduct remains a controversial element of the
Guidelines.
B. 18 U.S.C. § 3661: Whose Discretion Is It Anyway?
Further complicating the issue of the Commission's authority to
mandate broad sentencing inquiries under the Guidelines is the
continuing presence in the post-Guideline world of a sentencing
provision enacted in 1970, during the time of total judicial discretion
at sentencing. In Williams v. New York, the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution does not limit the evidence a judge may receive at
sentencing.52 This decision was codified in the 1970 enactment of 18
U.S.C. § 3661. 53 The statute was sweeping in the discretion it granted
to sentencing judges: "No limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may
receive and consider for the purposes of imposing an appropriate
sentence."5 4
Approximately a decade later, Congress contemplated
sentencing reform to curtail the seemingly unfair sentencing practices
and widespread disparities resulting from the current system. The
direct target of its disapproval seemed to be 18 U.S.C. § 3661, as it
opened the sentencing inquiry as wide as possible. Remarkably,
however, Congress did not repeal this broad statute during the reform
of federal sentencing to curtail judicial discretion.55 Because no
mention was made of this statutory provision during sentencing
reform nor was any attempt made by Congress to reconcile these
seemingly conflicting messages, 18 U.S.C. § 3661 has occupied an
uneasy place in post-Guideline sentencing jurisprudence.56 This
uneasiness has led to even greater ambiguity over the authority of the
52- See 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) (originally codified in the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title X, § 1001(a), 84 Stat. 951 (1970)).
54. Id.
55. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 merely redesignated the provision to its
current designation, 18 U.S.C. § 3661. See Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
Title H, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 8H 3551-3559 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-
998 (Supp. V. 1987)).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148,156-57 (1997).
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Commission to limit or expand traditional judicial discretion. That
ambiguity has led to a particularly ironic result: instead of the
Commission being constrained by the existence of § 3661, this statute
has been used to augment the Commission's authority to create
expansive guidelines.
The Supreme Court's peculiar usage of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 in two
cases involving the Guidelines has left the meaning of that statute and
the Commission's authority in a state of disarray.57 First, in Witte v.
United States, the Court held that consideration of uncharged cocaine
importation in order to impose a higher Guideline sentence on
marijuana charges was not "punishment" for cocaine conduct and
therefore did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment.58 Confusion regarding the existence of informational
discretion in a mandatory-guideline system came from the dicta in
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court, in which she claimed that
the relevant conduct provisions were designed to channel sentencing
discretion and "to make mandatory the consideration of factors that
previously would have been optional."59  Therefore, according to
Justice O'Connor, section 1B1.3, the relevant conduct provision in the
Guidelines, was the embodiment of 18 U.S.C. § 3661.
According to Justice O'Connor's view, an inquiry that was
previously permissible had now become mandatory. Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3661, a judge was never required to engage in that inquiry; instead,
he was merely permitted to do so by Congress. However, under
section 1B1.3, a judge is now required to look at relevant conduct
because the Commission has mandated that inquiry. Ironically, the
very problem that drove the creation of the Guidelines-wide-
ranging sentencing inquiries resulting in sentencing disparities-has
been cemented into the Guidelines.
The Supreme Court further complicated the relationship
between 18 U.S.C. § 3661 and the Guidelines in United States v.
Watts.6° There, the Court overturned two Ninth Circuit decisions and
held that a sentencing court may consider conduct of which a
defendant has been acquitted, so long as that conduct is later proven
57. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 151-57; Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397-401 (1995).
See also Thomas W. Hutchison, Sentencing Discretion After Watts, 9 FED. SENTENCING
REP. 306,308 (1997) (arguing that Watts has confused the issue over 18 U.S.C. § 3661).
58. 515 U.S. at 397.
59. Id. at 402 (citing United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer,
J.)). O'Connor quoted Breyer's opinion in Wright, in which he explained that, "very
roughly speaking, [relevant conduct] corresponds to those actions and circumstances that
courts typically took into account when sentencing prior to the Guidelines' enactment."
Id. (quoting Wright, 873 F.2d at 441).
60. 519 U.S. at 149.
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by a preponderance of the evidence. 61 In explaining this holding, the
Court again relied on the judicial discretion codified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3661, which states that "holdings [that would forbid reliance on
acquitted conduct] conflict with the clear implications of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3661, the Sentencing Guidelines, and this Court's decisions,
particularly Witte v. United States."62
The Court in Witte had stated that relevant conduct embodied
the discretionary factors a sentencing court used to take into account
before the Guidelines were enacted.63 Thus the determinative issue
for the Supreme Court in deciding Watts was framed in the following
way: whether or not sentencing judges could consider acquitted
conduct at a sentencing hearing after the Guidelines were enacted was
dependent on whether sentencing judges could have considered
acquitted conduct at a sentencing hearing before the Guidelines came
into existence.64 Somewhat absurdly in light of the massive 1984
Sentencing Reform efforts, the Court seemed to indicate that
whatever was appropriate for a judge to consider before sentencing
reform was appropriate afterwards, despite the presence of an
entirely new statutory regime designed to limit the prior system.
"Highly relevant-if not essential-to [the judge's] selection of an
appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics," said the
Court in Watts, without even a mention of Congressional sentencing
reform or the goals behind it.65
The two concurring opinions in Watts further augmented the
confusion over the conflation of judicial sentencing discretion and the
Commission's authority to enact Guidelines and demonstrate the lack
of consensus over the role of the Commission regarding relevant
conduct. 66 Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer each wrote separately to
61. See id. In Watts, the Supreme Court overturned two Ninth Circuit decisions which
had held that sentencing courts could not consider the conduct of the defendants'
underlying charges of which they had been acquitted. Idl (overruling United States v.
Watts, 67 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Putra, 78 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir.
1996)). Every other Court of Appeals had held that sentencing courts could consider
acquitted conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 635-36 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
United States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Ryan, 866
F.2d 604, 608-09 (3rd Cir. 1989). The panel in Putra explained that it was imposing "a
judicial limitation on the facts the district court may consider at sentencing, beyond any
limitation imposed by the Guidelines." 78 F.3d at 1389.
62. Watts, 519 U.S. at 149 (citations omitted).
63. 515 U.S. at 397.
64. 519 U.S. at 152.
65. Id at 151-52 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,247 (1949)).
66. See generally id at 158 (Scalia, J., concurring); id- at 158-59 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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express their different, and disagreeing, visions regarding whether the
Sentencing Commission might have the authority to reverse the
Supreme Court's decision in Watts and mandate that sentencing
courts disregard acquitted conduct. 67 Justice Breyer argued that the
relevant conduct provision was a policy decision by the Sentencing
Commission to recognize the prior practice of sentencing judges, and
consequently, "the Commission could decide to revisit this matter in
the future. '68 Breyer pointed to the fact that the Commission had
previously considered barring the consideration of acquitted conduct
under "relevant conduct. '69 Thus, "the power to accept or reject such
a proposal remains in the Commission's hands." 70
Justice Scalia adamantly disagreed with this conception of the
Commission's authority.71 He argued, instead, that because 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(b)(1) requires that the Guidelines be "consistent with all
pertinent provisions of title 18 of the United States Code," they must
conform with 18 U.S.C. § 3661.72 Therefore, the Commission has no
regulatory authority to forbid sentencing judges from looking at
acquitted conduct.7 3
These two opposing opinions illustrate the conceptual disaster
that the Sentencing Commission's authority has become. Although
both Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia agreed that sentencing judges
currently have the ability to look at acquitted conduct at sentencing,
their underlying conceptual visions could not be more different.
Justice Breyer believes the Commission has complete authority to
regulate the information that may be taken into account at a
sentencing inquiry. Justice Scalia believes the sentencing judge
retains full discretion in that inquiry under § 3661, effectively
trumping the Commission's control.
The confusion over the Commission's relationship with the
discretion of a sentencing judge can also be seen in the circuit court
decisions previously discussed. These decisions, notably United States
v. Galloway and United States v. Thomas, concern the statutory
authority for section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines.74 In Galloway, the
67. See generally icL at 158 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 158-59 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
68. Id- at 159 (Breyer, J. concurring).
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 158 (Scalia, J., concurring). For an excellent critique of Justice Scalia's
opinion, see Hutchison, supra note 57, at 310-12.
72. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (1)).
73. See id.
74. United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 420-21 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United
States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 1085,1089 (5th Cir. 1991).
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court buttressed its statutory arguments regarding § 994 with a
historical analysis of the sentencing power of judges.75 Because courts
had been allowed to consider uncharged criminal conduct at
sentencing and Congress had enacted a statute codifying this
discretion, the enactment of a relevant conduct provision was merely
an implementation of what had long since been settled in the
sentencing realm.76 Ironically, the case cited for this proposition,
Williams v. New York, was written at a time when federal judges had
virtually unlimited sentencing discretion, the results of which many
had thought drove Congress' desire to cut down on discretion through
a guideline system.7 7  The majority in Galloway dismissed
congressional intent to limit judicial discretion and avoid sentencing
disparities as unpersuasive: "To use the disparity argument to set
aside the guideline is to ignore the statutory language in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3661, which, as we have noted above, clearly allows a judge to
consider 'background, character, and conduct of a person' when
determining a sentence."78
This ambiguity over the Sentencing Commission's role regarding
judicial discretion has left the Commission in a peculiar position. The
statutory remnants of judicial discretion combined with the
apparently broad authority that Congress gave the Commission to
create guidelines has created a strange new world, where the old
discretionary inquiry allowed by 18 U.S.C. § 3661 has been cemented
into place by the Sentencing Commission. Therefore, in the name of
certainty and fairness, and in the hopes of eliminating unfair
sentencing disparities, the system has ended up in practice back at the
broad-based sentencing inquiry that prevailed prior to 1984.
C. Relevant Conduct and Beyond: The Story of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)
Against this background of muddled judicial discretion and
agency authority, United States Sentencing Guideline section
2G2.2(b)(4) was enacted and subsequently amended. At first glance,
this provision seems to be merely a singular occurrence that is
unlikely to be repeated in other guidelines. However, section
2G2.2(b)(4) is quite the opposite-it is a warning of what the current
confusion over the Commission's authority and judicial discretion
can, and likely will, produce in the future.
Section 2G2.2(b)(4) is a sentencing enhancement that is applied
to offenses falling under section 2G2.2, entitled "Trafficking in
75. 976 F.2d at 419 (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)).
76. See i& at 419-20.
77. See Williams, 337 U.S. at 246.
78. Galloway, 976 F.2d at 422.
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Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; Receiving or
Transporting... Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a
Minor; Possessing Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a
Minor with Intent to Traffic. '79 This specific offense characteristic
was added to the sentencing guideline for possession of child
pornography by amendment in 1991, pursuant to instructions given to
the Commission by Congress in the Treasury, Postal Service, and
General Government Appropriations Act of 1992.80
Under section 2G2.2(b)(4), the base offense level ascribed to the
crime of possession of child pornography (15) will be increased five
levels, or by an increase of one-third, "[i]f the defendant engaged in a
pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a
minor."' Therefore, this enhancement mandates that a defendant
convicted of possession of child pornography receive a sentence
increased by 33 percent if the defendant engaged in the behavior
described. In the Application Notes following section 2G2.2 of the
1998 Guidelines Manual, the Commission defined "[p]attern of
activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor[,]" for
the purposes of subsection (b)(4), as "any combination of two or
more separate instances of the sexual abuse or the sexual
exploitation.., of a minor by the defendant, whether or not the
abuse or exploitation involved the same or different victims." 2
Left ambiguous by the Commission was the breadth of this
sentencing enhancement. The language "any combination" seemed
to imply inquiring into the defendant's entire life; however, since the
creation of the Guidelines, sentencing judges had not been permitted
to engage in such a wide-ranging inquiry into the defendant's past
criminal activity, unrelated to the charged offense. Unlike section
2G2.2(b)(4), which begins with the language "if the defendant
engaged in a pattern of activity," virtually all other specific offense
characteristics which require enhancing the defendant's sentence
begin with limiting language, such as "if the offense involved" or "if
the victim was. ' 83  The most comparable specific offense
characteristic to section 2G2.2(b)(4) is that which applies to stalking
and domestic violence, under section 2A6.2(b)(1).84 In this provision,
the Commission provides for a two-level enhancement "[i]f the
offense involved.., a pattern of activity involving stalking,
79. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (1998).
80. See id. app. c, amend. 435 (1997).
81. 11. § 2G2.2(b)(4).
82. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(b)(4) application note 1 (1998).
83. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998).
84. See id. § 2A6.2(b)(1).
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threatening, harassing, or assaulting the same victim."85 However,
even this provision, which also refers to a pattern of activity by the
defendant, does not remotely approach the scope of the sentencing
inquiry allowed under section 2G2.2(b)(4). Section 2A6.2(b)(1) is
confined to conduct surrounding the offense of conviction, whereas
section 2G2.2(b)(4) extends indefinitely.
Section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines requires that courts look at
relevant conduct in applying sentencing enhancements to a criminal
defendant's sentence.86 Relevant conduct, as defined in section
1B1.3, includes only acts that occurred during the commission of the
offense, in preparation for that offense, or in furtherance of that
offense; in other words, the sentencing inquiry was confined to
conduct surrounding the offense for which the defendant was
convicted. 87 However, for section 2G2.2(b)(4), the language of the
sentencing enhancement could be interpreted as mandating an
inquiry stretching far beyond relevant conduct, the confines that had
been set up by the Commission (and ostensibly desired by Congress)
to constrain sentencing judges.
Therefore, because of the linguistic ambiguity of the
enhancement and the potentially far-reaching implications of
extending the sentencing inquiry beyond relevant conduct, most
courts have interpreted this sentencing enhancement narrowly, as
though it were circumscribed by the traditional parameters of section
1B1.3 so as to be limited to conduct related to the offense of
conviction.88 In fact, the two appellate courts that have considered
this issue have defined a pattern of activity as limited to conduct
related to the offense charged. 89 They relied on two textual reasons
for support: 1) the provision's location in the Specific Offense
Characteristic section of the guideline, and 2) the contrast between
the language of the sentencing enhancement and the language of a
similar discretionary departure contained in the guideline.90
In Chapman, the First Circuit held that the pattern of activity
enhancement was "inapplicable to past sexual abuse or exploitation
unrelated to the offense of conviction." 91 The court relied on the
85. Id (emphasis added).
86. See id § 1B1.3.
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Surratt, 87 F.3d 814, 819 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Chapman, 60 F.3d 894, 901 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Canada, 921 F. Supp. 362, 365
(E.D. La. 1996); United States v. Surratt, 867 F. Supp. 1317, 1320 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
89. See Surratt, 87 F.3d at 819; Chapman, 60 F.3d at 901.
90. See Surratt, 87 F.3d at 819; Chapman, 60 F.3d at 901.
91. 60 F.3d at 901 (citing with approval the district court's holding in Surratt, 867 F.
Supp. at 1320, regarding the exclusion of unrelated conduct).
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placement of subsection (b)(4) under the heading of Specific Offense
Characteristics, which only requires an increase in the defendant's
sentence when, "as part of the offense of conviction, the defendant
undertakes the actions listed therein."9g No persuasive authority was
found that supported the government's proposition that "specific
offense characteristic" stretched beyond that definition. Secondly,
the court contrasted the language of subsection (b)(4), an
enhancement, and the language of Application Note 5, which called
for an upward departure for any instance of sexual abuse or
exploitation "whether or not such sexual abuse occurred during the
course of offense." 93 Therefore, the court concluded that "[t]he
absence of similar language in subsection (b)(4), combined with the
fact that the subsection is classified under the rubric of 'Specific
Offense Characteristics,' compels the conclusion that the application
of the subsection does not require that the pattern of activity relate to
the offense of conviction."
94
In United States v. Surratt, the Sixth Circuit explicitly agreed with
the Chapman court's reasoning and found "that there are limitations
to what conduct the court may consider to determine the applicability
of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4)."95  The government there sought to
introduce evidence at sentencing showing that "for two decades, the
defendant had engaged in the sexual abuse and exploitation of more
than a dozen females." 96 Included was evidence of sexual abuse of
Surratt's young daughter and of his alleged molestations of other
identified minors.97 The district court excluded this evidence as
irrelevant to the charged offense and therefore did not apply the
sentencing enhancement for a pattern of activity.98 In upholding this
exclusion by the district court, the Sixth Circuit relied on the same
factors as the court in Chapman: first, section 2G2.2(b)(4) is a
Specific Offense Characteristic and secondly, the contrast with the
92. Id- (quoting Surratt, 867 F. Supp. at 1320) (emphasis added).
93. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) application note 5) (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Surratt, 87 F.3d at 818. The facts of Surratt are as follows: The defendant
responded to an ad for child pornography that had actually been placed in a magazine by
undercover postal inspectors. After return correspondence by the postal inspectors,
Surratt ordered two magazines and one videotape depicting minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct. When law enforcement officials subsequently executed a federal search
warrant at Surratt's house, they seized fifty-one videotapes, as well as adult pornography
and photographs of the head of his minor daughter pasted over the faces of adult women
in pornographic pictures. Further investigation revealed that Surratt had initiated sexually
suggestive contact with at least ten neighborhood girls. See iL at 816.
96. lId at 817 (emphasis added).
97. See id at 816.
98. See Surratt, 867 F. Supp. 1317,1320 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
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departure in Application Note 5.99
However, the interpretation of subsection (b)(4) as limited to
"relevant conduct" seemed to displease the Sentencing Commission,
and the Commission - without any apparent urging from Congress
- attempted to correct the courts' errors. The previously ambiguous
definition of "pattern of activity" in section 2G2.2 Application Note 2
was amended in the 1996 Guidelines Manual to explicitly include a
much broader range of conduct. 1'0 Pattern of activity was now
defined as "any combination of two or more separate instances of the
sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor by the defendant,
whether or not the abuse or exploitation (A) occurred during the
course of the offense, (B) involved the same or different victims, or (C)
resulted in a conviction for such conduct.'101
In the historical note relating to this amendment, the Sentencing
Commission explained its intention and the purpose of the revisions.
First, the amendment was a clarification that "pattern of activity"
should include conduct not part of the offense.'02 This clarification
was in part a response to the holding in Chapman that unrelated
conduct could not be considered for the enhancement.0 3 The
Commission went on to explain the scope of inquiry for this
enhancement: "the conduct considered for purposes of the 'pattern
of activity' enhancement is broader than the scope of relevant conduct
typically considered under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)."'1 4
Never before had the Commission attempted to expand the
sentencing inquiry concerning criminal conduct to include temporally
distinct, factually unrelated activities by an offender. 0 5 Although it
was accepted that a court could look at past convictions to increase a
prior offender's sentence, this inquiry was distinct from that
undertaken regarding the crime charged, in which it was previously
assumed that only conduct relevant to the crime could be considered.
99. See Surratt, 87 F.3d at 819.
100. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 Application Note 1 (1996).
The effective date of this amendment was November 1, 1996. See id. app. c, amend. 537.
The placement of this definition was switched from Application Note 2 to Application
Note 1. See id
101. Id app. c, amend. 537 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. See id ("This revision responds in part to the holding in Chapman, 60 F.3d at 901,
that the 'pattern of activity' enhancement is inapplicable to past sexual abuse or
exploitation unrelated to the offense of conviction. The amended language expressly
provides that such conduct may be considered.").
104. Idi (emphasis added).
105. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998). Also see the




The Commission can now push the envelope and require judges
to look beyond "relevant conduct" in their sentencing inquiries
precisely because of the ambiguity surrounding their authority and
the confusion surrounding the discretion given to sentencing judges.
Because two important issues remain undecided-first, whether
relevant conduct is necessary or merely permissible in light of
congressional purpose, and secondly whether the Commission could
restrain a sentencing judge's discretion despite 18 U.S.C. § 3661-the
Commission can take advantage of this situation to mandate wide-
ranging inquiries with little fear of reprimand from either the
judiciary or the legislature. 1°6
1H. Deference Run Wild: Appellate Review of the Sentencing
Commission, From Mistretta to Stinson
A further complication in the muddy waters of the Commission's
authority is the increasingly lenient judicial review of the actual
Guidelines. Originally, the Supreme Court seemed to view the
Commission as constrained by the specific delegation of authority by
Congress; however, recent decisions have led to a new understanding
of the Commission's discretion that greatly expands its powers
beyond that of a standard administrative agency and strips the
judiciary of its powers to oversee the Commission. When this
increasingly deferential standard collides with the substantive
developments that have occurred regarding the sentencing inquiry
described above, it becomes apparent that the Commission has
become an entirely different creature than originally understood.
First, it is necessary to understand how the current standard of
review has developed over the course of time. In Mistretta v. United
States, the Supreme Court first encountered the Sentencing
Commission and the Guidelines, and the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission's creation through an
express delegation of authority from Congress and the Commission's
statutory mandate to create sentencing guidelines. 1°7 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, sheds light on the Court's
original conception of the Commission's purpose and the constraints
106. Although various courts have applied the sentencing enhancement as amended,
the only decision to address the constitutionality or statutory authority of the amended
commentary to section 2G2.2(b)(4) was United States v. Hamilton, in which the court
summarily dismissed the challenge. 175 F.3d 1026, 1999 WL 86053, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 2,
1999) (unpublished disposition) ("[T]he enhancement is expressly authorized by
§ 2G2.2(b)(4), as amended, and does not exceed the very broad constitutional power to
legislatively define relevant factors at sentencing.").
107. 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989).
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by which it is bound. 08 The Court found that Congress' delegation of
authority was "sufficiently specific and detailed." 09 As the Court
explained, Congress had charged the Commission with clear goals
and purposes and also had "prescribed the specific tool-the
guidelines system-for the Commission to use in regulating
sentencing."" 0  Also, Congress "legislated a full hierarchy of
punishment... and stipulated the most important offense and
offender characteristics to place defendants within these
categories.""'
Despite this specific delegation of authority, the Court in
Mistretta acknowledged that the Sentencing Commission still enjoyed
a great amount of discretion in formulating the Guidelines." 2
However, this discretion was clearly viewed by the Court as confined
to two areas defined by the explicit grant of authority from
Congress." 3  First, "the Commission does have discretionary
authority to determine the relative severity of federal crimes and to
assess the relative weight of the offender characteristics that Congress
listed for the Commission to consider.""14 This first area was created
by 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(c) and (d), in which the Commission was
instructed to consider enumerated factors as it deemed them to be
relevant."
5
Secondly, the Commission was given discretion "to determine
which crimes have been punished too leniently, and which too
severely.""116 According to the Court, the second area of discretion
was created by 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) and would primarily involve the
equalizing of punishment for similar crimes.117 Therefore, although
the Commission had significant discretion, Mistretta suggested that it
was confined by the terms delineated by this delegation.
This broad grant of authority and significant discretion left lower
federal courts in a quandary: in light of Mistretta, how exactly should
they review the Commission's specific constructions of the Sentencing
Reform Act in creating particular guidelines? The responses from
various courts of appeals were mixed, but most signaled that a wide
108. See idL
109. IL at 374.
110. Id.
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amount of latitude would be given to the Commission. 18 For
example, the Fifth Circuit applied the lenient interpretive standard
for executive agency regulations developed by the Supreme Court in
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council to the Commission's
construction of the Act: "we review the Commission's construction
of the Sentencing Reform Act, as promulgated in the sentencing
guidelines, to determine if it is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the
Act."'1 9 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that a sentencing guideline
must be upheld if it is "sufficiently reasonable" in light of the
Congressional directives of the Sentencing Reform Act.12
0
Therefore, post-Mistretta, the amount of discretion afforded the
Sentencing Commission seemed to be fixed at a level analogous to
that of a standard administrative agency. However, this standard of
review was relaxed even further after the Supreme Court's decision in
Stinson v. United States.121  There, the Court analyzed the
Commission's authority differently than in Mistretta, resulting in a
new avenue for the Commission to implement its own policy
judgments without oversight from the judicial or legislative branch.
In Stinson, the Supreme Court held that commentary in the
Guidelines Manual is binding on federal courts. 22 Although the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the Sentencing Reform Act did
not explicitly authorize guideline commentary, that fact was not
dispositive.123 Furthermore, the Court also did not find persuasive the
fact that Congress does not review amendments to the commentary
under 28 U.S.C. § 994(p), which the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit had relied on to reach the opposite conclusion.124
The Court drew an analogy between the Commission's commentary
concerning guidelines and "an agency's interpretation of its own
legislative rule," because of two similarities.'25 First, the express
118. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 2 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Galloway, 976 F.2d 414,420 (8th Cir. 1992) (en bane).
119. United States v. Harper, 932 F.2d 1073, 1075 (5th Cir. 1991) (construing Chevron
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984)).
120. United States v. Martinez-Cortez, 924 F.2d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-46).
121. 508 U.S. 36 (1993).
122. Id. at 37-38. Extensive commentary follows all guidelines in the Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, explaining what the guidelines are intended to mean. The Sentencing
Commission has provided in a guideline that commentary may "interpret a guideline or
explain how it is to be applied" or "provide background information, including... reasons
underlying the promulgation of the guideline." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.7 (1998).
123. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 41.
124. See Stinson v. United States, 957 F.2d 813, 815 (11th Cir. 1992).
125. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44.
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delegation of rulemaking authority by Congress is similar to that of a
federal agency and secondly, the functional purpose of commentary is
to assist in the application of the rules created. 26  Therefore,
guideline commentary is binding on federal courts "unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the [guideline]."' 127
The authority to bind federal courts to a specific interpretation of
a guideline gave the Commission tremendous discretion and, more
importantly, an ability to skirt the more traditional method of
amending a guideline. After the decision in Stinson, if the
Commission decided to change a guideline, it would no longer have to
amend the actual guideline, which requires congressional approval.
Instead, the Commission could simply amend the commentary that
explains the guideline, as long as "the guideline which the
commentary interprets will bear the construction.' ' 128  As the
Supreme Court frankly acknowledged in Stinson, the courts would be
bound by this commentary "even though it is not reviewed by
Congress, and prior judicial constructions of a particular guideline
cannot prevent the Commission from adopting a conflicting
interpretation that satisfies the standard ... set forth today.' 29
Indeed, no other administrative agency is afforded such complete
discretion virtually without any judicial oversight.130 Therefore, the
decision in Stinson handed the Sentencing Commission a tremendous
opportunity to implement its vision of the Guidelines, with very little
interference from the judicial or legislative branches of government.
The dramatic nature of the judiciary's hands-off approach to the
Guideline commentary is illustrated best by section 2G2.2(b)(4). In
this instance, when the Commission decided it disagreed with the
judiciary's interpretation of this sentencing enhancement, the
Commission was not required to amend the guideline itself, which
would require submittal to Congress for a six-month period of review,
during which time Congress could modify or disapprove it.131 Rather,
the Commission could expressly overrule prior court decisions by
amending the commentary, which was not subject to either legislative
approval or strict judicial review. In fact, the Commission has used
this method; it is precisely how the change to section 2G2.2(b)(4) was
accomplished. 132
126. See id at 44-45.
127. h at 45 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410,414 (1945)).
128. Id at 46.
129. Id
130. See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 64
(9th ed. 1995).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1993).
132. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. c, amend. 537 (1998).
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IV. The Future: Reigning in the Commission's Current
Indiscretion
A The Current State of Affairs
More than a decade after the supposed revolution in federal
criminal sentencing, what has been achieved? If the enactment of
section 2G2.2(b)(4) is any indication, federal criminal sentencing has
become a radically different institution than what was desired and
called for during congressional reform and, ironically, is not so
different than pre-reform sentencing. The purpose behind the
creation of the Commission was to limit and control judicial
discretion. Regardless of whether that goal was desirable in theory, it
has never become a reality. And through the collision of substantive
and procedural developments discussed above, it is slipping further
away. Instead, judicial discretion still exists through the interplay of
"relevant conduct" in the Guidelines and § 3661. However, now it is
cloaked in the Commission's guise, as the Guidelines themselves now
mandate the broad inquiries of old. Furthermore, these mandates can
be created with virtually no legislative or judicial oversight at all, as
the Commission can simply place any questionable new idea in the
Guidelines' commentary, which does not require congressional
approval and receives virtually no judicial review whatsoever.
Why be concerned about this new sentencing world and how it
differs from the original purpose of reform? The first and least
important reason is because the Guidelines are shaping up to be an
entirely different creature than first thought. When the success or
failure of the Guidelines and the Commission is measured, the reality
of the system and the disparity from what was intended should be
taken into account.
Second, and more importantly, this system has profound
implications for criminal defendants. As Judge Beam pointed out in
his Galloway dissent, the Commission's primary task was to equalize
sentences between similar defendants found guilty of similar crimes;
however, since the "promulgation [of the relevant conduct guideline],
courts have repeatedly struggled with the tendency of relevant
conduct provisions to dwarf the actual count of conviction."'133 In
other words, the sentences that criminal defendants receive in the
federal sentencing scheme often bear little relation to the amount of
133. United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 432 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Beam, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that, in Galloway's particular case, the "combination of present
and prior convictions produces approximately a 15-month sentence, [but] unconvicted
relevant conduct on its own doubles that sentence") (emphasis added).
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time required for the charged offense; instead, the sentence is greatly
increased for the conduct surrounding the offense. Again, this
sentencing scheme necessarily leads to different sentences for the
same crime.
Third, as illustrated by the sentencing enhancement for child
pornography in section 2G2.2(b)(4), the Commission has pushed
beyond the relevant conduct provision, mandating inquiry into
conduct completely unrelated to the offense of conviction. This
provision illustrates a new and frightening avenue the Commission
could travel: judges could now be required by the Guidelines to look
at the defendant's entire life to find unrelated criminal conduct with
which to increase the sentence.
How is this different than the pre-Guidelines sentencing inquiry?
Before the Guidelines, a judge had the discretion to choose whether
or not to look that deeply into a defendant's life under 18 U.S.C. §
3661. However, now this discretion has been fundamentally altered.
A judge must follow the Guidelines and, if requested by the
government, engage in an inquiry that is as broad in scope as any
engaged in before the Guidelines were created. Therefore, the post-
Guideline sentencing scheme retains the expansiveness of the pre-
Guideline sentencing inquiry, while abandoning the flexibility given
to sentencing judges to decide whether to engage in that inquiry. No
one seems to benefit from that scheme. Sentencing judges are
required to look into behavior they may previously have ignored
because it was irrelevant or unfair. Criminal defendants are
sentenced on the basis of conduct for which they were not convicted
and which is unrelated to the offense of conviction. Finally, the
guideline system itself loses its legitimacy because it has failed in its
singular broad purpose: to reduce unwarranted sentencing
disparities.
Finally, and equally as important, we should be concerned
because of the deference given the Commission by the legislature and
judiciary. Although the Commission clearly has expertise in
sentencing and therefore should be accorded some deference as an
administrative agency, it should not be given more deference by the
judiciary than any other agency. After Stinson, the courts could
essentially wash their hands of responsibility for reviewing the
commentary to the Guidelines. Because Congress also does not
review the commentary to the Guidelines, this development left the
Commission unchecked in the interpretations it gives to its
Guidelines.
Again, the example of section 2G2.2(b)(4) illustrates the dangers
of the current state of the Guidelines. Without congressional
approval, the Commission overturned the judicial interpretation of
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that sentencing enhancement through an amendment to the
commentary. That amendment went further in scope than any other
guideline, yet because it was contained in the commentary, it was
effectively unreviewable by the courts or Congress. Therefore, a
provision with profound implications not only for specific criminal
defendants, but also for the institutional structure of federal criminal
sentencing, has gone unnoticed.134
B. Changes for the Future
What does the future hold for federal criminal sentencing? To
reign in a system gone awry, as discussed above, three changes are
proposed. First, courts should re-evaluate the lenient standard of
review that is currently applied to the Guidelines and especially to
Guideline commentary. The deference currently given the
Commission borders on total abdication of judicial review of this
agency's actions. In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
the Supreme Court acknowledged that an agency may have particular
expertise which should be accorded deference by the courts.
135
However, that deference might not be as important in the realm of
sentencing, for who better to evaluate the use of the Commission's
expertise than judges, fellow experts in the area of sentencing? Here
the Commission lies within the judicial branch, has federal judges as
members, and acts within a realm of which judges have peculiar
knowledge.136 Furthermore, as pointed out by Judge Beam in his
dissent in Galloway, the separation of powers concern which requires
"deference to the compromise between Congress and the executive in
the usual regulatory regime is attenuated when, as here, the body
responsible for promulgating the regulations is also within the same
branch of government.' 137  The hands-off approach currently
employed should be rejected in favor of a stricter review by courts of
the Guidelines and their commentary, in which each provision is
examined against the intent of Congress in creating the Commission.
This more stringent review by the courts is supported by the original
conception of the delegated authority given to the Commission, as
134. As discussed in footnote 106, the only decision to address the constitutionality or
statutory authority of the amended commentary to section 2G2.2(b)(4) was United States
v. Hamilton, in which the court summarily dismissed the challenge. 175 F.3d 1026, 1999
WL 86053, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb 2, 1999) (unpublished disposition) ("[ihe enhancement is
expressly authorized by section 2G2.2(b)(4), as amended, and does not exceed the very
broad constitutional power to legislatively define relevant factors at sentencing.").
135. 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
136. See Galloway, 976 F.2d. at 434 (Beam, J., dissenting).
137. Id
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delineated in Mistretta.138  The Court acknowledged that the
Commission had discretion but noted that it was explicitly defined by
the specific grants of authority found in the Sentencing Reform
Act.139 To return to this judicial relationship with the Commission
would result in a system much closer to that conceptualized by
Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act.
Secondly, Congress should act to refine the statutory authority of
the Sentencing Commission. Through confusion over whether
relevant conduct is necessary to implement the goals of Congress or
whether it is just a policy choice made by the Commission, the
Commission's reach has grown farther and farther. The most sensible
decision seems to be an overhaul of the relevant conduct provision.
In its current form, the relevant conduct provision has been aptly
criticized as creating a criminal justice system in which "prosecutors
now effectively control both the charging system and the sentencing
system. And to an ever-increasing extent, the two are one and the
same."' 40 Furthermore, every state sentencing commission in the
United States, contrary to the federal commission, has adopted some
form of conviction offense sentencing instead of pure "real offense"
sentencing.' 41 They have done so because they believed that a system
based on relevant conduct would violate due process and other
constitutional provisions.142
What should the limit be? Congress should make it clear that
relevant conduct is the outer limits of the Commission's authority,
and that the Commission must not reach out to temporally distinct,
unrelated activity, as it did in section 2G2.2(b)(4).
Third, the federal judiciary should struggle to reconcile their
interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 3661 with the guideline system. The
current interpretation has resulted in a Commission that can do
practically anything it wants in the name of judicial discretion. A
more compelling interpretation, offered by Thomas W. Hutchison in
his article Sentencing Discretion After Watts, is that section 3661 has
been codified in the Guidelines at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4, in which courts
may "consider, without limitation, any information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of the defendant, unless
otherwise prohibited by law," to determine whether a discretionary
138. See supra text accompanying notes 107-17.
139. See id.
140. United States v. Davern, 970 F.2d 1490, 1508 (6th Cir. 1992)(Merritt, C.J.,
dissenting).
141. DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EvOLUTION OF
MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING GUIDELINES 62-63 (1988).
142. See id. at 159-61.
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departure is warranted from the guideline range.143  This
interpretation would leave judges able to depart from the guideline
range in unusual cases, without allowing in judicial discretion at every
moment of guideline sentencing. To continue with the interpretation
currently advocated by the Supreme Court would be to effectively
subvert the congressional goal of placing careful limits on judicial
discretion at sentencing.
Section 2G2.2(b)(4) is a warning of the havoc that the Sentencing
Commission now has the power to wreak on our criminal punishment
system. However, if the Congress, the Commission, and the judiciary
begin to implement some of the changes outlined above, they may be
able to collectively reign in the Sentencing Commission and provide
us with the opportunity to experience the originally promised reform
of federal criminal sentencing.
Conclusion
In 1984, Congress decided to reform federal criminal sentencing
and to eliminate both the unfair practices of sentencing and the
disparities that resulted. However, that vision for the future has not
been realized. Instead, as evidenced by section 2G2.2(b)(4), the new
sentencing system is beginning to look suspiciously like the old one
which Congress wanted to overhaul. The combination of the original
decision by the Commission to include a relevant conduct provision,
the continued existence of 18 U.S.C. § 3661, and the deferential
appellate review given to the Commission, has created a sentencing
regime far different from that vision. Regardless of whether
sentencing reform was originally a good idea, its success or failure can
never be evaluated until we return to the model called for in 1984 and
correct the Commission's current indiscretions.
143. Hutchison, supra note 57, at 309. See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1B1.4 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661).
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